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pAbstract: The paper analyzes key labor market and institutional features of
developing countries that affect functioning of unemployment insurance: a large
informal sector, weak administrative capacity, and large political risk. It argues that
these countries should tailor an OECD-style unemployment insurance program to
their circumstances, among others by relying on self-insurance (via unemployment
insurance savings accounts), complemented by solidarity funding, as a key source of
financing; by simplifying monitoring of job-search behavior and labor market status;
and by piggybacking on existing networks to administer benefits. The paper also
addresses the question whether developing countries should introduce
unemployment insurance.
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Unemployment insurance (UI) is the most common public income support program
for the unemployed in developed countries. In these countries, it typically offers good
protection: it covers the majority of employed persons, irrespective of occupation or
industry, and provides adequate smoothening of consumption patterns. In the early
1990s, transition countries also introduced UI programs, and their use in developing
countries is on the rise as well.
The incidence of unemployment benefit programs is strongly related to the level of
development (see Vodopivec 2004). But prompted by increased exposure to foreign
markets and fearing future global crises, more and more developing countries (includ-
ing lower middle-income countries such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka) are contem-
plating to introduce UI. Such considerations are bolstered by the potential efficiency
and distributive advantages of reforming social protection programs for workers in
developing countries. Namely, in many developing countries the balance between job
and worker protection is tilted in the favor of the former: virtually all have – typically
exceedingly restrictive – severance pay programs, and very few have UI programs (see
Holzmann et al. 2012). It is often argued that removing excessive job protection would
not only boost the creation of more and better jobs, but also improve job prospects for
vulnerable groups (see, for example, Heckman and Pagés 2004). And it goes without
saying that reducing job protection is an extremely sensitive task that can often be2013 Vodopivec; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
Vodopivec IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2013, 2:1 Page 2 of 23
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/1implemented only if accompanied by introducing or strengthening income protection
programs for workers – UI being one of them.
While providing an excellent opportunity to bolster both worker protection and eco-
nomic efficiency, the introduction of UI programs in developing countries poses major
challenges. When is a country ready to introduce an UI program? Which factors influ-
ence whether UI programs operate successfully and how can the programs’ design be
adjusted with respect to coverage, eligibility rules, the generosity of benefit, structure of
incentives, and monitoring? In particular, how to account for factors such as a lack of
administrative capacity, a large informal sector, and the profoundly different nature of
unemployment in developing countries?
To address these questions, the paper analyzes key labor market and institutional
features of developing countries that affect the functioning of UI: a large informal sec-
tor, weak administrative capacity, and large political risk. It argues that these countries
should tailor an OECD-style UI program to their circumstances, among others by rely-
ing on self-insurance (via unemployment insurance savings accounts), complemented
by solidarity funding, as a key source of financing; by simplifying monitoring of job-
search behavior and labor market status; and by piggybacking on existing networks to
administer benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses a difficult question
of whether and when developing countries should introduce UI. Section 3 provides
stylized facts about the UI program, focusing on its income protection as well as effi-
ciency properties, thereby outlining possible opportunities to strengthen worker protec-
tion of countries contemplating UI introduction and establishing limits of such
endeavor. Section 4 discusses how to adjust program design to account for developing
countries’ specific circumstances, and section 5 concludes.2. Should a developing country establish a UI program?
The first logical question to be addressed by this paper is: should a developing country
introduce a UI program in the first place? The likely welfare gains arising from
improved worker protection – smoothened consumption patterns – are to be
reconciled with administrative costs and, above all, possible efficiency losses, including
disincentives for leaving unemployment or entering informal jobs while receiving
benefits, higher equilibrium unemployment, and more persistent unemployment.
Weighing the benefits and costs of such introduction is complicated by the fact that it
takes place in the political arena and under less-than-perfect information set that
includes theoretical insights and, primarily, past experience with UI programs that
comes mostly from developed countries. A possible objection against the introduction
of a UI program is also the fact that even a suitably modified program may fare worse
than other income-support mechanisms, for example, employment-guarantee schemes
as introduced in India, or training programs that simultaneously enhance employability
of workers and offer income support via training stipends.
What complicates the task tremendously is the ambiguity about how to fit these, ex-
ceedingly complex social programs to the specific circumstances facing developing
countries. In these countries, protection effects of UI programs may differ from those
in developed countries. Because the program is limited to the formal sector, the
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non-poor segments of the population and thus it is unlikely that UI would significantly
contribute against the reduction of poverty and income inequality. Public programs also
displace private transfers, thus reducing the net effect of benefits on individuals’ welfare
– the effect that is likely more important in developing countries where informal
networks seem to be tighter. 1 The efficiency properties of the program may also be dif-
ferent in developing countries – monitoring the fulfillment of benefit eligibility
conditions is likely to be less effective, and so an identically-designed program is likely
to produce less desirable outcomes (see below).
Ultimately, it is up to the social partners to make a decision to introduce UI. It entails
considering many aspects of UI performance and weighing difficult trade-offs that un-
doubtedly evade rigorous economic modeling and testing. While stopping short of pro-
viding a definitive advice, below we elaborate on two considerations that such a
decision could rest upon, the stage of development of the labor market and the intro-
duction of UI as a quid pro quo for reforming badly performing severance pay.Progress in the modernization of the labor market
A country’s vulnerability to unemployment risk – reflecting “demand” for UI – can be
gauged by the stage of development of the labor market. Namely, social insurance is a
response of modern, industrial societies to the changing nature of the labor market,
above all, to the development of a modern employment relationship (Atkinson 1995).
In an industrialized and urbanized society, employment becomes a “discrete” event:
workers either work or do not work. This development has strong implications for un-
employment – if they cannot find a job in wage employment (working for others),
workers are unable to resort to self- or home-production, because they are divorced
from ownership of means of production. Similarly, older and less productive workers in
industrialized societies stop working altogether once their productivity drops substan-
tially, whereas under the different labor market conditions of traditional societies they
continue to be economically active as long as they produce something valuable. Thus the
“invention” of unemployment and the changing nature of retirement created the need to
insure against the new non-employment contingences. In other words, social insurance is
based on the concepts of unemployment and retirement as specific social constructs.
The share of agriculture and the level of urbanization can be taken as indicators of
the degree of modernization of the labor market. In addition, the level of sophistication
of non-labor market institutions – such as the taxation system and health regulations
that impinge on the ease of entry to the informal sector, and exit from it – also heavily
determines the nature of the labor market. Interestingly, cross-country empirical testing
of the incidence of unemployment benefit program showed that demand factors –
proxied by per capita GDP and the share of urban population – are indeed important
determinants of the presence of such a program in a country (see Vodopivec 2004). 2
Let us also emphasize that it is certainly a prerogative of the public sector to provide
UI, because strong information asymmetries – moral hazard and adverse selection
problems –prevent markets from providing such insurance (for a recent survey of lit-
erature on social insurance, see Chetty and Finkelstein 2012). Moral hazard arises be-
cause UI reduces self-protection; adverse selection arises because information problems
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Correcting for market failures calls not only for regulation – obligatory membership to
avoid the problem of adverse selection, but also for its public provision, to improve the
monitoring capacity and financial sustainability of the program. Another advantage of its
public provision is the enhanced ability to pool resources across large groups, which
reduces strains on the program arising from the covariant nature of unemployment risk.Bolstering efficiency by moving from job to worker protection
The introduction of a UI program provides an ideal opportunity to re-balance job and
worker protection by relaxing overly restrictive severance pay systems, a common
problem among developing countries (for international comparisons of the generosity
of severance pay, see Holzmann and Vodopivec 2012). UI and severance pay are closely
related programs as they both cushion the loss of earnings associated with job loss
while covering more or less identical groups of workers. Reforming severance pay at
the same time as introducing UI therefore makes a lot of sense: it facilitates designing
the programs so as to complement each other, and it recognizes the political economy
reality that the reduction of job protection can only be accomplished if accompanied
by enhanced worker protection.
Severance pay is often considered one of the least appropriate options of income sup-
port for the unemployed, because it offers inadequate income protection and imposes
large efficiency costs. On the income protection front, severance pay suffers from three
main weaknesses. First, the system suffers from the so-called nonperformance problem
(the fact that despite legal entitlement, many workers fail to obtain benefits). 3 Second,
severance pay benefits are inefficient, as the same amount is paid regardless of the dur-
ation of the unemployment spell. And third, severance pay reduces the access of vul-
nerable groups, including youth, to jobs (Blanchard 2000). On the efficiency front,
there is ample evidence that severance pay reduces labor market flows and thus acts as
a source of “labor market sclerosis.” It therefore reduces productivity via hindering
technological change (see Autor et al. 2007 for the study on the US and Bassanini et al.
2009 for OECD countries), as well as, particularly in the context of the overall stringent
employment protection legislation, reduces employment levels (see Holzmann and
Vodopivec 2012 for a recent review of theoretical and empirical findings).
It has to be emphasized that UI compares favorably with severance pay regarding
both efficiency and income protection. 4 As described below, the efficiency costs
associated with UI are mostly associated with employment disincentives and, by and
large, such effects compare favorably with much more significant efficiency losses that
are associated with severance pay. The UI system is also more equitable, not only be-
cause it does not decrease access to jobs for vulnerable groups (as severance pay does),
but also because it is often associated with other benefits such as training. Moreover,
UI clearly offers superior income protection, because it is based on much better risk-
pooling arrangements and because the duration of UI benefit receipt can be adjusted to
match the (expected) duration of the unemployment spell.
In the context of moving from job to worker protection, two options of severance pay
reform available to developing countries are worth singling out (see Holzmann and
Vodopivec, 2012):
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see the description and evaluation in Hofer et al. 2012). Such a reform replaces
existing, conditional severance pay with unconditional, regular payments to all workers
that are deposited directly to their individual accounts and are accessible in the event
of a worker separation (introducing pure UISAs).
b) Converting the severance pay into savings account as part of a hybrid UI program
(Chilean model, see below). The hybrid UI program thus consists of two components:
UISAs of individual workers created by converting severance pay, and a solidarity
based, risk-pooling UI component, financed by employer and worker contributions.
The improvements brought by the first option include removing obstacles to labor
market flexibility, enhancing access to good jobs for marginal groups, strengthening
worker protection by removing the nonperformance problem of severance pay, and en-
hancing pension support (under UISAs, unused savings are merged with pension
accounts). The additional benefit under the second option is improved worker protec-
tion via allowing access to wide-based, solidarity risk pooling.3. Stylized facts about UI: opportunities and limitations posed by UI
introduction
An OECD-style UI program typically requires that workers and their employers pay
earnings-related contributions which, upon separation, entitle workers to unemploy-
ment benefits according to predetermined eligibility conditions. While it mimics mar-
ket insurance, the program deviates from actuarial principles by charging premiums
which do not reflect individual risks. To qualify for benefits, a worker must satisfy the
minimum covered employment or contribution requirement. The cause of dismissal
may affect the individual’s eligibility for benefits, with quitters often being disqualified.
Continuing eligibility requires that applicants are available for and willing to take a job,
and that they actively search for it. Benefits are typically a proportion of the individual’s
pay in the most recent employment spell. The initial replacement rate is usually be-
tween 40 and 75 percent of average earnings (for details about national UI programs
see Vodopivec 2004, OECD 2011 and Tatsiramos and van Ours 2013).
Based on the evidence from developed and developing countries, this section presents
stylized facts about two crucial aspects of UI performance. First, it focuses on income
protection effects, examining how well UI delivers on its primary objective: compensa-
tion of income loss due to unemployment. Second, it describes main efficiency effects
of UI, showing that through various channels and due to complex interactions, UI
generates a wide variety of efficiency repercussions, some intended but mostly unin-
tended, chief of them being work disincentives created by the moral hazard. By doing
so, the section sheds light both on opportunities countries can exploit by introducing
UI, as well as on difficulties and limitations of this endeavor.
The discussion below provides important insights about two key issues addressed by
this paper. It sheds light on many dilemmas and trade-offs that underlie the decision of
whether or not a country introduces the UI program, an issue addressed in the previ-
ous section. Moreover, given that the observed outcomes reflect not only program de-
sign but also circumstances under which these programs operate, it pinpoints aspects
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countries, dictate modifications of the UI design – the aspects and modifications dealt
with in the next section of the paper.Income protection effects
UI, thanks to its wide risk-pooling, enables strong consumption smoothing for all
covered workers, helps protect against poverty during economic downturns, and
performs well under various types of shocks. The protection is limited to formal sector
workers only, however.
In developed and transition countries, UI is typically mandated and is the most
widely used income protection program for the unemployed, usually covering all
workers (often excluded are the self-employed, agricultural workers and household
workers – see OECD 2011 and Vodopivec et al. 2005). In contrast, because of their
large informal employment, UI in developing countries tends to cover only a part of
the workforce. As a consequence, the recipiency rate (measured as the ratio of benefi-
ciaries to the number of unemployed) is much lower in developing than in developed
countries, ranging from 5–8 percent in Argentina (Iturriza et al. 2008), 10–15 percent
in China, South Africa and Turkey, 20 to 25 percent in Chile and Russia, to around 30
percent in Brazil (OECD 2011).
Research on developed countries (primarily the United States) suggests that un-
employment benefits play a significant role in consumption smoothing (for overview
see Chetty and Finkelstein 2012). (Hamermesh and Slesnick 1995) find that the welfare
of benefit recipient households was on average only 3–8 percent lower than the welfare
of otherwise identical households. Gruber (1997) finds that in the absence of UI, aver-
age consumption expenditures would fall by 24 percent, given the US unemployment
benefit design. Very few studies examine the consumption-smoothing effects of income
support programs in developing countries. One notable study is Kugler (2005), showing
that withdrawals from unemployment insurance savings accounts in Colombia
increased consumption by non-employed household heads.
In transition countries, unemployment benefits represented an important source of
household income in the mid-1990s. As many as 78 percent of households in Hungary
and 65 percent of households in Poland with at least one unemployed worker received
unemployment benefits; the share in other countries was lower, particularly in Estonia
and Latvia, where just 17–19 percent of such households received unemployment
benefits (Vodopivec et al. 2005). Interestingly, among households with at least one un-
employed member, the receipt of unemployment benefits was less prevalent among
poor households, except in Estonia.
The evidence also suggests that during economic downturns, unemployment benefits
can strongly reduce poverty. In particular, in the mid-1990s unemployment benefit
programs contributed substantially to poverty reduction in European transition coun-
tries – a somewhat unexpected finding given that reducing poverty is not one of the
stated goals of unemployment benefits. The effects were strongest in Hungary and Poland.
In Hungary poverty among the unemployed fell more than 50 percent; in Poland it
declined 45 percent (Vodopivec et al. 2005). In Hungary 5.2 percent of the total
population was drawn out of poverty by unemployment benefits; in Poland the figure
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other countries as well, albeit less significantly. Poverty fell 31 percent in the Slovak
Republic, 16 percent in Slovenia, 9 percent in Latvia, and 5 percent in Estonia. These
strong effects reflect both the favorable distributive properties of unemployment
benefit programs and small poverty gap of these countries. Gabe and Whittaker
(2012) report similar findings for US during the last recession. They estimate that the
UI benefits drew out of poverty over one quarter of unemployed who received
benefits.
By decomposing welfare gains of increasing benefit level to liquidity and moral haz-
ard effects, Chetty (2008) offers a new approach to value benefits of UI. This decom-
position uses revealed preference method to value the benefits of insurance. The
liquidity effect allows the recipient to choose a level of effort compatible with complete
markets (that is, allows liquidity constrained individuals to search for a job longer), the
effect that is efficiency enhancing; the moral hazard effect reflects reduced incentives
due to the price subsidy of leisure introduced by unemployment benefits, the effect that
is efficiency distorting. Empirical estimates suggest substantial liquidity effects of un-
employment benefits both in developed countries (in the US – Chetty 2008, Austria –
Card et al. 2007, and Norway – Basten et al. 2012) as well as in developing countries
(Argentina – Hijzen 2011). In fact, because many households are close to a subsistence
level of consumption and financial market imperfections are deeper, liquidity effects are
likely to be especially pronounced in developing countries, and hence welfare gains of
social insurance higher. 5Efficiency effects
Unemployment insurance affects the production side of economy through a variety of
direct and indirect mechanisms and channels. Below we focus on key such outcomes,
above all, unemployment and labor market transitions.
Benefits affect unemployment through two main channels. First, they influence job-
search effort and the reservation wage of recipients, prolonging unemployment spells
by making leisure more attractive as well as, if benefits are time limited, increasing job-
finding rate before the benefit exhaustion (Mortensen 1977). Second, unemployment
benefits improve the bargaining position of workers. This leads to higher wages and
hence a higher equilibrium unemployment rate (Pissarides 2000). Apart from increas-
ing the equilibrium level of unemployment, unemployment benefits also make un-
employment more persistent. That is, economies with unemployment benefits
experience larger and more prolonged unemployment following a transient shock. The-
oretic models argue that the ‘non-UI’ economy recovers more rapidly as reservation
wages adjust more quickly and job-search intensity is higher than in the ‘UI’ economy. 6
Empirical studies of the effects of UI on unemployment are voluminous and, by and
large, they show that unemployment benefits create reemployment disincentives and
wage pressures which increase the unemployment rate of the economy. Many studies
on individual countries (using microdata) investigate the effect of the level and poten-
tial benefit duration on the probability of exit from unemployment and find that gener-
ous and longer benefits are positively associated with the duration of unemployment
spells, corroborating the presence of the moral hazard problem (a review of recent
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see surveys of Holmlund 1998, Calmfors and Holmlund 2000, and Krueger and Meyer
2002). The empirical research on the intensity of job search per se by benefit claimants
is scarce and inconclusive. 7
As for the size of these effects, Layard et al. (1991) estimate the elasticity of un-
employment duration with respect to benefit level to be 0.2–0.9, depending on the state
of the labor market and the country concerned. Estimates from newer studies range
from 0.4 to 1.6 (see details in Tatsiramos and van Ours 2013). Estimates of elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to potential benefit duration also vary substan-
tially, but are in general lower than benefit level elasticity. Earlier studies, reviewed by
Krueger and Meyer (2002), put it in the range of 0.1 to 0.5. Estimates from more recent
studies include 0.4 (for men) and 0.8 (for women) for Slovenia (van Ours and
Vodopivec 2006), 0.12 for Austria (Lalive et al. 2006, 2011), and 0.13 for Germany
(Schmieder et al. 2012).
Disincentives created by unemployment benefits show up also in a pronounced spike
in the probability of exit from unemployment just before benefit exhaustion. For ex-
ample, Card and Levine (2000) confirm an increase in the exit rate from unemployment
before benefit exhaustion in USA. Similar findings are reported for the European coun-
tries, including Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) and Caliendo et al. (2013) for Germany,
Lalive et al. (2006) and Lalive (2008) for Austria, Rebollo-Sanz (2012) for Spain, and
van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) and Boone and van Ours (2012) for Slovenia. Interest-
ingly, Boone and van Ours (2012) find that end-of-benefit spikes are more likely to
occur in transitions to permanent jobs and interpret this as optimizing behavior of
workers who assume that employers will accept postponing the job starting date so as
to coincide with the benefit exhaustion. However, Card et al. (2007) argue that the
magnitude of the spike at exhaustion is exaggerated, as it may be affected by measure-
ment problems if spells are measured by duration of registered unemployment.
Strong evidence of moral hazard effects of UI is provided also by the evidence on the
effects of financial incentives and benefit sanctions. For example, Meyer (1995) shows
for US that unemployed workers who were offered a bonus for fast re-employment sig-
nificantly reduced their unemployment spells, without affecting their re-employment
earnings. While van der Klaauw and van Ours (2011) find no effects of re-employment
bonuses, they show that benefit sanctions in the form of temporary benefit reduction
were effective in stimulating benefit recipients to find a job. Similarly, the introduction
of benefit sanctions strongly increased the exit from unemployment in Switzerland
(Lalive et al. 2005), in Denmark (Svarer 2011), and in Germany (Boockmann et al. 2009).
Only few studies analyze the effect of UI benefits on unemployment duration and
transitions out of unemployment in developing countries. Cunningham (2000) shows
that an (small) increase in benefits duration and loosening eligibility criteria had no ef-
fect on the duration of unemployment in Brazil. Two recent studies on Brazil contra-
dict that result. Gerard and Gonzaga (2012) find that extending unemployment benefits
reduces probability of formal re-employment in Brazil. This result is confirmed by
Hijzen (2011) who finds a positive effect of UI (and severance pay) on the duration of
non-employment in Brazil, with a more pronounced reduction of the job-finding rate
of formal than informal jobs. In fact, Hijzen confirms the presence of the moral hazard
both in the form of reduced work incentives per se as well as in the form of increased
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et al. (2008) find that individuals enrolled in an unemployment assistance program in
Argentina are 12–19 percentage points less likely to exit unemployment than non-
participants of the program, with negative effects being particularly strong for women. 9
Unemployment benefits may also affect other labor market outcomes, ranging from
the quality of post-unemployment jobs to labor force participation and to the choice
between entering regular versus informal jobs. The findings about these effects are far
from reaching a consensus, with some studies finding beneficial effects of unemploy-
ment benefits on these variables while others found no such effects (for a recent review
of this literature see Tatsiramos and van Ours 2013). These differences in UI program
outcomes are likely attributable to differences in circumstances across countries that
were not captured by the studies.
Finally, the macroeconomic role of UI is also worth emphasizing. By automatically
injecting additional resources and reducing taxes during recessions, UI acts as an auto-
matic stabilizer that moderates the magnitude of economic downturns, thus providing
important macroeconomic effects. Empirical evidence in North America shows that UI
reduces GDP losses during downturns by 10–15 percent (Chimerine et al. 1999). The
estimate is even higher for the 2007–10 period: the stabilizing effect of the regular UI
program was estimated at one-tenth of the real GDP fall caused by the recession
(Vroman 2010). The introduction of may also UI encourage the emergence or expan-
sion of more risky jobs and/or industries, thereby increasing output and growth
(Acemoglu and Shimer 1999 and Acemoglu and Shimer 2000).4. How to tailor UI programs to developing countries?
The evidence shows that in developed countries, the UI program provides good protec-
tion for the majority of the workforce, but at a cost to economic efficiency. Below we
argue that UI program functions reasonably well under favorable labor market
conditions and suitable institutional support, but that circumstances in developing
countries are less conducive. It follows that for optimal performance, the program has
to be tailored according to local circumstances and thus it has to deviate from a stand-
ard, OECD-style UI program.
The most important circumstances that dictate deviations from an OECD-style pro-
gram are the low stage of development of the labor market and weak administrative
capacity. In developed countries, UI emerged in response to the developments of the
labor market, specifically, the emergence of the unemployment as a “discrete event”
(see below). In important ways, labor market conditions in developing countries, par-
ticularly the prevalence of a large informal sector, make unemployment a “continuous”
variable, with important consequences for the design of UI. Moreover, the administra-
tive capacity of developing countries (even in upper-middle income group) lags behind
the capacity of developed countries, which is likely to worsen the efficiency properties
of the UI program.
Focusing on specific circumstances, in this section we suggest adaptations of the
standard UI program to fit developing countries. We argue that such adaptations in-
clude self-insurance (personal savings) as a main source of financing, to be
complemented by solidarity funding, and the simplification of eligibility conditions –
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tory measure.Adapting UI to the undeveloped labor market
Key labor market characteristics that developing countries should consider when
designing their UI programs are the “non-discrete” nature of unemployment and the
fact that the poor are less than proportionally represented among the unemployed.
Under these circumstances, an OECD-style UI program inhibits self-protection as a re-
sponse to unemployment, imposes high costs of monitoring continuing eligibility, and
brings regressive redistribution. To respond to these problems, we propose that the de-
sign of UI should be changed to exempt informal sector work from disqualifying
conditions for continuing eligibility, simplify conventional monitoring of continuing eli-
gibility, and rely exclusively on employer and worker contributions as sources of finan-
cing, that is, refrain from using government subsidies for financing UI benefits.
(i) Unemployment as a “non-discrete” event
In contrast to developed countries, in developing countries a large proportion of the
workforce is “partly unemployed” – underemployed, and the entry to informal employ-
ment, and exit from it, is easy (there are low capital requirements and reputation costs).
The prevalence of underemployment can be explained by the fact that the transition
from underemployment to open unemployment can be viewed as an income effect. Un-
employment is virtually nonexistent in traditional societies, where individuals cannot
afford to be jobless and therefore undertake any type of work, even work that leaves
them underemployed or that is unsuitable for their skills. In other words, rather than
waiting to find a “good” job, workers in developing countries undertake any type of job
– self-protection emerges as their dominant strategy in dealing with the risk of un-
employment. 10
Another reason why unemployment in developing countries is a “non-discrete event”
is the large size of the informal economy, associated with low entry and exit costs. Low
costs can be explained by small capital requirements due to low labor productivity in
general, but very importantly, also by few institutional constraints imposed on forming
self-employment or informal employment relationship. In contrast, developed countries
impose large costs of entry – through taxation, sanitary as well as health and safety
regulations, zoning rules, and licensing – for many occupations, including those that in
developing countries flourish in the informal sector (such as retail trade, transportation,
various household services and repair).
(ii) The unemployed are not necessarily poor
The second feature of unemployment which is important for the design of the UI pro-
gram in developing countries is the fact that in these countries, members of poor
households may be less than proportionally represented in the ranks of the unemployed
(Cox Edwards and Manning 2001). For example, in Peru and Brazil, the poor show dis-
proportionately less unemployment than the rich; while the pattern is reversed in
Mexico and Uruguay, unemployment is still heavily represented among richer quintiles
(de Ferranti et al. 2000). Moreover, in the Philippines in 1997, only 12.1 percent of
households whose heads were unemployed were poor, in comparison to a 25 percent
poverty incidence in general (Esguerra et al. 2001). Although the same group of
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lation, its contribution to the total number of poor persons was only 6.1 percent. Simi-
larly, in Sri Lanka unemployment has been closely related to the status in the
household and the availability of income support from relatives, both critical factors
for allowing extended periods of job search (Word Bank 1999). Therefore, it seems
that in low income countries, members of poorer households cannot afford to stay un-
employed for a prolonged period of time. They try to cushion the loss of earnings by
opting for low productivity jobs (mostly in the informal sector) instead of not working
at all while they continue to search for more adequate, better paid jobs.
To address the above issues, one can suggest the following modifications of an
OECD-style UI design for developing countries:
(i) exempt informal sector work from disqualifying conditions for continuing
eligibility, 11 and
(ii) rely exclusively on employers’ and workers’ contributions as the source of
financing.Exempting informal sector work from disqualifying conditions for continuing eligibility
If informal sector jobs are condoned, benefit recipients can avail themselves to employ-
ment opportunities that are, by and large, unavailable in developed countries where un-
employment is a “discrete” event. While disregarding informal work increases the costs
of UI – what seems to be an inevitable outcome for developing countries 12 – it at the
same time reduces the duration of non-employment following the job loss, which is ef-
ficiency improving. Note that OECD-style UI programs also allow for some work by
benefit recipients via earnings disregard, to combat work disincentives created by the
program. True, the above arrangement of keeping benefits while working in the infor-
mal sector stimulates informality and thus it is obviously a “second best” alternative,
the one prompted by the infeasibility of tracking employment status of benefit
recipients in developing countries. 13
Relying exclusively on employers’ and workers’ contributions as sources of financing
This deviation from common UI practice derives from the fact that in developing coun-
tries, the occurrence of unemployment tends to be concentrated among the better off,
non-poor population. To prevent a regressive redistribution, the financing of the
scheme should therefore rely exclusively on contributions from workers and employers
covered under the scheme, and not on public funding.Adapting UI to weak administrative capacity
The performance of social programs also depends on administrative capacity to deliver
the program – the statement that applies with full force to UI. Developing countries,
particularly low-income ones, typically have a weak capacity to administer such a pro-
gram. As argued below, under such administration, an OECD-style UI program would
produce several undesirable outcomes: long durations of benefit receipt, double dipping
(UI recipients working in the informal sector and receiving earnings on top of UI
benefits), and high prevalence of bribes. To improve the program design, we propose
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monitoring of job-search behavior and labor market status.
Why is the administrative capacity of developing countries insufficient for a standard
UI program? Such a program requires continual, extensive and sophisticated informa-
tion that is rarely available in developing countries, particularly low-income ones. These
countries may lack social security databases on individual workers that allow cost-
effective methods of cross-checking the benefit receipt with earnings or the receipt of
other benefits. With recent advancements in information and communication technol-
ogy, however, the record-keeping of payments of insurance premiums as well as
disbursements of funds has become increasingly affordable even in low-income countries.
An example of such a program which exists even in low-income countries are pension
programs, which typically require a long history of contributions for individual workers.
Precisely this kind of information program is necessary for the administration of UI.
A much more demanding problem relates to monitoring of continuing eligibility
conditions. An OECD-style UI program requires officials to confirm continuing benefit
eligibility based on their judgment, checking whether recipients are in fact working,
whether they are available and willing to take a job, and whether they are actively
searching for a job. The need for such screening stems from the moral hazard problem
of UI, as the beneficiaries face disincentives to take a job or to hide a job if employed.
In many developing countries, the capacity to arrive at unbiased decisions about such
eligibility (and to avoid bribes) is weak.
Several factors make monitoring of continuing eligibility conditions under a standard
UI program a challenging task even for developed and transition countries. One is the
difficulty of monitoring “availability for work” – the requirement often used to curtail
informal employment. Different countries use different approaches, but they all have
shortcomings. For example, amendments in the unemployment benefit law of Slovenia
in the late 1990s required that benefit recipients make themselves available for contacts
by employment offices for three hours per day, but results showed little effect on dis-
qualification (Vodopivec, 2004). Moreover, such an arrangement may well backfire be-
cause it forces employment counselors to assume two opposing roles: one of job
facilitator, and the other of a policeman. On the one hand, counselors try to help the
unemployed by preparing a job plan, directing them to training, etc.; on the other hand,
they are forced to “spy” on the unemployed to find out whether they are in fact avail-
able to take a job – and, if deemed necessary, disqualify them from receiving benefits.
Similar difficulties exist with respect to the monitoring of the requirement of “actively
seeking employment”. Because this requirement entails many different aspects, it can-
not be easily incorporated in legislation. What can normally be reasonable to expect
from the unemployed may well depend on individual circumstances (such as skills,
qualifications, experience, and also the length of the unemployment spell), as well as
on available vacancies in the local labor market. Additional problems are involved in
determining a “suitable job” and the amount of work that may be undertaken without
being disqualified from benefit receipt. It is thus not surprising that disqualification
from unemployment benefits occurs rarely, and that this practice differs across coun-
tries as well as within a country. 14
The task of monitoring continuing eligibility is somewhat easier in countries with
interlinked administrative bases of individuals. For example, in the Poznan region
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whether unemployment benefit recipients had already taken a job. The screening has been
based on advanced communications capabilities among employment offices, on one side,
and Social Security Administration and Tax Office, on the other (Vodopivec, 2004).
The above discussion has the following implications about how to adjust an OECD-
style UI program to developing countries:
(i) simplify monitoring of eligibility and avoid judgments in awarding benefits, and
(ii) strengthen financial incentives to address motivational problems by relying on
unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) and keeping benefits modest.
Simplifying monitoring of eligibility and avoiding judgments in awarding benefits
The existence of a large informal sector, together with ease of entry and exit, makes the
verification of the unemployment status difficult if not impossible. Similarly, ample in-
formal employment opportunities make monitoring of job search behavior costly and
intractable (among others, it is difficult to specify a “suitable job” as well as the
conditions for active job search, including the proofs of such search). And in
developing countries, confirming benefits based on the judgment of government
officials, as required by UI, would be prone to misuse due worse quality of governance
and the prevalence of corruption. These circumstances call for simplifying
requirements about monitoring of job-search behavior and labor market status, and
perhaps even eliminating personal monitoring of continuing eligibility requirements in
the early phases of the program. They also underscore the need to deploy alternative
ways of avoiding the misuse of the benefits: imposing work or training requirements, as
well as introducing financial incentives (see below). 15
Argentina’s administrative hurdles connected with the introduction of UI are instruct-
ive. Argentina introduced its UI program in 1992, following a macroeconomic crisis
that raised the fear of large-scale, open unemployment. 16 While the administration of
benefits has seemingly proceeded smoothly (workers are informed of their eligibility
and receive payments on a timely basis), the program only after several years acquired
the capacity to detect recipients who found new jobs in the formal sector, via cross-
checking unemployment benefit recipients with workers enrolled in social security
(Mazza 2000). This way, significant numbers of benefit recipients actually working in
the formal sector are being purged from the benefit receipt lists. Even a greater number
of recipients are likely working in the informal sector, but faced with the above-
described monitoring problems, the Argentinean UI program altogether avoids
checking the continuing eligibility of UI recipients.
While simplifying monitoring of benefit eligibility, countries introducing UI should
devise a strategy countering the culture of entitlement mentality. An attractive option
is including the principle of mutual obligation in the benefit contract. That is, the con-
tract should make clear that in return for receiving benefits, recipients are expected to
look for a formal employment, as well as undertake activities that will improve their
skills and employment prospects, including training and participation in public works
or community work. 17 It is likely that in initial stages countries will lack the capacity
for effective implementation of more elaborate UI eligibility requirements (both of job
search and labor market status, see above), but referring benefit recipients to outside
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approach. As employment services develop, countries will also increase their capacity
make the principle of mutual obligation more effective. 18
Strengthening financial incentives and keeping benefits modest
The lack of appropriate administrative capacity to effectively monitor continuing eligi-
bility and to impose sanctions implies that UI programs of developing countries are
particularly prone to the moral hazard problem. Benefit recipients draw benefits longer
(many for the maximum potential duration – such is the experience even in the well-
thought of program introduced by China, see Vodopivec and Tong 2008) and many
simultaneously work in informal jobs (see the evidence for Brazil above). Keeping the
level of benefits low and potential benefit duration short alleviates this problem, but, of
course, does not remove it. A complementary, and arguably a more powerful, method
is to strengthen the design of UI programs by introducing financial incentives for (re)
employment via unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) – an approach that
also minimizes bad governance and political risk. 19
To combat the moral hazard, UISAs attempt to introduce “self-policing” into UI
programs. Under the UISAs, each worker is required to save a fraction of earnings in
his or her account and to draw unemployment benefits from it; upon retirement, any
unused balance on the account is merged with the worker’s pension account. In theory,
by internalizing the costs of unemployment benefits, UISAs improve work incentives
and thus avoid or reduce the moral hazard inherent in traditional UI schemes (Orszag
and Snower 2002) – while, in principle, they can provide the same protection as trad-
itional UI. 20 By government matching contributions of individuals, UISAs also offer a
way to expand participation in unemployment benefit programs to informal sector
workers, which is another potential advantage of UISAs (for a recent overview of the
experience with government matching to expand pension coverage both in developed
and developing countries, see Hinz et al. 2013).
UISAs come in different varieties. First, there are pure UISAs, where withdrawals are
strictly limited by the account balance (that is, the balance on an individual’s UISA must
always be nonnegative). Such programs have been in existence in a number of Latin
American countries for decades, often covering also housing and health expenditures.
While firm evidence is lacking, the ability of these programs to provide protection against
unemployment risk – in absence of solidarity funding – is questionable, particularly as
these programs are plagued by deficient financial management (for an overview and as-
sessment of these programs in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and
Venezuela, see Ferrer and Riddell 2012). Second, in contrast to pure UISAs, UISAs-cum
-borrowing allow individuals to borrow, within predetermined limits, from their UISAs (a
variant of such a program exists in Jordan). Finally, there are the so-called “hybrid,” UISA-
cum-solidarity-fund programs, where benefits are financed by UISAs as well as, under
certain conditions, by the solidarity fund: Chile introduced such a system in 2002, and
Mauritius in 2009 (known as a “Workfare Program” – see Republic of Mauritius 2008).
The innovative Chilean UISA program – combining social insurance with self-
insurance – is worth scrutinizing. Unemployment contributions are split between indi-
vidual UISAs and a solidarity fund. Both workers and employers pay them, the latter
both to UISAs and the solidarity fund. Employers’ contributions to UISAs reduce their
Vodopivec IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2013, 2:1 Page 15 of 23
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/1severance payments obligations, so severance pay is being partly replaced by the UI
program. To stimulate reemployment, benefit recipients first draw resources from their
UISAs, and upon depletion, from the solidarity fund. 21 Withdrawals from UISAs are
triggered by separation from the employer, regardless of the reason. Withdrawals from
the solidarity fund are triggered by insufficient resources on individual accounts, if the
claimant satisfies the usual conditions of continuing eligibility under UI (not working,
being available for work and searching for job). By 2009, the program had 2.9 million
contributors, 78.6 percent of the targeted population (for details of the Chilean program,
see Berstein et al. 2012). 22
The Chilean program thus combines two attractive features. While its innovative
component – UISAs – addresses the moral hazard problem, the solidarity component
retains the ability to spread the risk widely. Such a version of UISAs can therefore im-
prove incentives in comparison to the traditional UI program, as well as income protec-
tion in comparison to pure UISAs programs.
The UISAs-cum-borrowing scheme that uses pension wealth as collateral also deserves
attention. Under this scheme (put in place, as the first country, by Jordan in September
2011), laid off workers are entitled to borrow from their UISAs up to a predetermined
threshold, depending on the individual pension wealth, thereby improving their con-
sumption smoothing abilities. The scheme uses the accumulated pension wealth as the
collateral and a source of funding; any outstanding debt upon retirement is subtracted from
the pension wealth (for defined benefit pension systems, the debt repayment would imply a
temporary reduction of pension). Note that the pension wealth collateral makes the system
proof to moral hazard and strategic behavior. Moreover, such a scheme allows for a quick
disbursement of benefits and could be introduced as a response to an emerging economic
crisis (see Robalino et al. 2009 for details and discussion of implementation issues).
UISAs are still largely an uncharted territory, with empirical evidence until recently
being limited to simulation studies probing the viability of the program. 23 A recent
study of Reyes et al. (2011) is the first one to provide empirical evidence supporting
theoretical predictions that UISAs improve work incentives. Using a mixed propor-
tional hazard rate model, Reyes et al. examine the determinants of the job-finding rate
of unemployment benefit recipients under the Chilean program and infer the effects of
UISAs by comparing parameters for various groups of beneficiaries. 24 Two findings
stand out. First, the larger the resources on the UISA at the start of the unemployment
spell (and thus the lower the potential benefits from the solidarity fund), the higher the
probability of exit from unemployment of benefit recipients – precisely the expected ef-
fect under “self-policing” of UISAs (and conversely, UISA accumulation of benefit
recipients not using solidarity fund is found not to affect their hazard rate). Second, for
beneficiaries using solidarity fund, the unemployment duration dependence pattern is
consistent with moral hazard effects, and for beneficiaries relying on UISAs only, the
pattern is free of such effects. The above findings, however, do not unambiguously pin-
point the causality, as selection into various groups may provide alternative explan-
ation, so more research of the effects of UISAs is needed.
Taking advantage of the existing institutional set-up
When setting up a UI program, developing countries should also take advantage of
existing administrative capacities and institutions. To avoid the creation of another
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existing financial and delivery networks to administer the program. In most countries
pension systems could be used, or Employee Provident Funds (EPFs) in countries rely-
ing on such funds to provide old-age benefits (Malaysia, Sri Lanka). Simplification of
program rules – above all, of continuing eligibility criteria, as suggested above – would
make such an option even more attractive. Moreover, existing providers of employment
services such as job-search assistance and job intermediation may be used to cater to un-
employment benefit recipients, as was the experience of Chile (see Berstein et al. 2012).
Building on existing arrangements may prove beneficial also for finding financial
sources for the program. One of the main stumbling blocks for the introduction of an
UI program is the objection of employers to pay contributions to the program. To
minimize additional contributions the UI program imposes, one option is to partly re-
direct training levy contributions. This path was chosen by Mauritius: when introdu-
cing a new UI program in 2009, it imposed a one percent contribution rate on
employers while, at the same time, reduced their training levy contribution rate by half
a percent (the training fund had been grossly underutilized).Case study: facilitating Sri Lanka’s severance pay reform by introducing UI?
In the last decade, Sri Lanka has made several attempts to reform its very restrictive
employment protection legislation and, as an integral part of such reforms, it also
considered – but not yet introduced – a UI program (see World Bank 2007). The
country thus makes a suitable candidate for a case study. In continuation we review
key labor market features and apply the guidelines developed above to derive the design
of a tailor-made program for Sri Lanka.
There are two key features that need to be considered. First, the Sri Lankan labor market
is still at a low stage of development. According to (World Bank 2007), two thirds of
workers are engaged in the informal sector and a large proportion of the workforce is
underemployed, features that make unemployment a “non-discrete event” (see the discus-
sion above). Moreover, as often among developing countries, unemployment is more
prevalent among richer segments of the population (World Bank 2007). Second, Sri
Lanka’s capacity to administer the program is weak. Above all, there is only a nascent net-
work of employment offices (called JobsNet), put in place in all 9 provinces, engaged
mostly in job-matching services but ill-prepared to administer a standard UI program
(particularly monitoring of eligibility). Sri Lanka is also susceptible to political risk, as there
are concerns about the ability of the EPF to pay retirement benefits because the govern-
ment often resorts to these funds to finance budgetary expenditures (World Bank 2007).
There is, therefore, a danger that a standard UI program applied to Sri Lanka would
perform unsatisfactorily. In particular, the monitoring of continuing benefit eligibility
conditions would be ineffective. This ineffectiveness would produce large employment
disincentives (moral hazard) and/or beneficiaries receiving the benefits while simultan-
eously working informally. Moreover, the program would stimulate corruption: because
of the personal nature of the monitoring of continuing benefit eligibility conditions,
and possibly vague definition of conditions and the lack of precise procedures to verify
them, recipients would have to share the “rent” arising from the continuation of benefit
eligibility with employment office councilors.
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hindered by large start-up costs, as well as large costs of processing benefit claims. Be-
cause the design of such a program calls for specific monitoring functions, the program
administration would be costly, as its ability to piggy-back on other administrative
systems (social security, in particular) would be limited. Moreover, there would likely
be problems with the enforcement of the payment of contributions to the UB fund,
particularly in industries with low layoff probability. And if substantial reserves of the
UB program are accumulated, they might be used for other purposes.
How can Sri Lanka adapt a standard UI program so as to avoid or mitigate the
above-identified problems? Based on the above argumentation, several important
features of UI program – some sharply deviating from an OECD-style program – can
be recommended. As arguably the most important innovation of the design, we argue
for financing of the benefits by UISAs created by the conversion of country’s restrictive
severance pay program along the lines of the Austrian program (see the description
and evaluation in Hofer et al. 2012). To strengthen the protection, EPF funds of
individuals, within predetermined limits, could be used as collateral to finance un-
employment benefits of those with negative balances. Keeping the benefits modest, say
a potential benefit duration of six months and a replacement rate of 50 percent, would
reinforce work incentives.
Moreover, to eliminate benefit eligibility conditions that require subjective assessment
of recipients’ behavior and status, one option is retaining employment in the formal
sector as the only disqualifying continuing eligibility condition while adhering to the
mutual obligation approach when forming a benefit contract. To piggyback on its
existing administrative capacity, the country could use the EPF network for recording
contributions and paying out unemployment benefits, and the “JobsNet” network for
providing employment support. Because it would cater to a richer segment of the work-
force, it is recommended that the program is financed solely though employers’ and
workers’ contributions, that is, that it avoids government funding.
In the longer run, the above framework could easily be adjusted to strengthen the so-
cial insurance component of the program – for example, via introducing a “hybrid”
program, see above – while keeping strong (re)employment incentives. Moreover, the
feasibility and options for introducing monitoring of job search behavior and labor
market status of UB recipients could be explored. And the effectiveness and efficiency
of employment services, such as job-search assistance, job development, and training,
for benefit recipients would have to be carefully assessed, and on that basis the employ-
ment support services to beneficiaries redesigned.5. Conclusions
The paper argues that the introduction of UI to developing countries provides an op-
portunity to bolster worker protection as well as, for some countries, to promote prod-
uctivity. Undoubtedly, however, it also poses major challenges: the performance of UI
depends not only on the design of the program, but also critically on country-specific
circumstances. The successful performance of UI in OECD countries is based on a
developed labor market, strong administrative capacity, an informal sector of modest size,
a low incidence of underemployment, and low political risk – conditions that are typically
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countries therefore needs to be carefully examined and the design of UI program adapted.
The paper identified key labor market and institutional differences between
developed and developing countries and analyzed how these differences affect the
functioning of OECD-style UI programs. It argued that developing countries should
tailor OECD-style UI programs to suit their circumstances, among others by (i) relying
on UISAs – complemented by solidarity funding – as a source of financing, (ii) simpli-
fying monitoring of job-search behavior and labor market status, (iii) keeping benefits
modest both in terms of replacement rate and potential benefit duration, (iv) drawing
on employer and worker contributions as a source of financing, and (v) piggybacking
on existing networks to administer benefits.
Although some warn against its premature introduction, the options proposed in this
paper offer an attractive approach, particularly for some developing countries. 25 For
example, such an effective, modern UI program may well suit the needs of a country
like Malaysia. It would allow it to take advantage of a hybrid, innovative UI designs, an
option particularly attractive for a country with a rich tradition of provident funds.
Moreover, following the Mauritius example, costs could be minimized by partly
redirecting existing employers’ training levy contributions (persistently underutilized)
to finance UI. And last but not least, UI introduction offers an opportunity for Malaysia
to modernize its outdated labor legislation and enhance labor market flexibility, thereby
increasing competitiveness and unleashing productivity growth.Endnotes
1Simulations of Cox and Jimenez (1995) show that the introduction of UI in the Phil-
ippines, assuming a 50 percent replacement rate, would erode 91 percent of the income
received from the public program, yielding very little net gain. Schoeni (2002) finds a
much smaller reduction of private transfers for the United States, estimating that 24–
40 percent of private transfers are displaced by unemployment benefits.
2Among the supply factors, ratification of the ILO freedom of association convention,
and the percent of the labor force included in trade unions, also proved important
determinants (Vodopivec 2004).
3In Malaysia, during the late 90s crisis employers paid 83 percent of the severance
pay claims to laid off workers (Mansor et al. 2001), and in Peru, only about half of all
workers legally entitled to severance pay received the benefit if dismissed (MacIsaac
and Rama 2001).
4(Blanchard 2004, p. 6) states that “High employment protection is a partial substitute
for unemployment insurance. It is a very poor substitute however. It comes with strong
distortions, and a potentially large efficiency loss. It impedes reallocation, decreasing
output, perhaps even affecting growth.”
5Despite empirical evidence that in developing countries household consumption is
quite resilient to income shocks, Chetty and Looney (2006) argue that social safety nets
in developing countries are particularly valuable because the welfare costs of consump-
tion fluctuations are very high.
6The interaction of institutions with adverse shocks also offers an explanation for the
long-term rise of European unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000).
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/17In one of more recent studies, Krueger and Mueller (2010) find for US that job
search is inversely related to the generosity of unemployment benefits with the elasti-
city between −1.6 and −2.2 and that job search intensity increases prior to benefit
exhaustion.
8By controlling for liquidity effects, Hijzen (2011, p. 31) finds that “. . . moral hazard
largely explains the impact of income support on the reduced rate of starting a formal
job. . . . It is not inconceivable that UI provides incentives for workers and firms to col-
lude by employing workers informally during the period of benefit receipt.”
9The 2002 Argentinian unemployment assistance program (“Plan Jefes”) is also sug-
gestive of administrative problems arising in delivery of such programs. According to
Iturriza et al. (2008), while the program was intended for unemployed heads of house-
hold, in practice these requirements were not fulfilled: administrators did not ensure
that applicants were really heads of households and nor that only the unemployed were
admitted in the program.
10In the words of Cox Edwards and Manning (2001, p.346): “The transition from
widespread underemployment to open unemployment is in part an income effect. As
countries grow and household incomes rise, jobless workers are able to endure periods
without work while waiting for a job to open.”
11While the proposal of exempting informal sector work is grounded in the above dis-
cussion, it is not, strictly speaking, the only alternative and more conventional approaches
could also be adopted, particularly as countries reach higher levels of development.
12According to OECD (2011, p. 96):”The public provision of UI tends be more costly
in emerging economies due to the presence of widespread informal work and its ten-
dency to reinforce informational problems, i.e. adverse selection and moral hazard.
13As an alternative that removes moral hazard associated with UI in developing coun-
tries – both the waiting effect and the incentives to work informally during the period
of benefit receipt – (Hijzen 2011) suggests UI benefits in Brazil to be paid as a lump
sum instead of as a monthly payment conditional on not working formally. While this
approach indeed remedies the traditional moral hazard associated with UI, it introduces
a new one: incentives to “dive and run”, that is, to become unemployed (perhaps via
colluding with the employer) just for a short time to collect the benefits, and then re-
employ. It also makes UI payments non-responsive to the duration of unemployment.
14(Micklewright and Nagy 1998) report that in Hungary disqualification from un-
employment insurance benefits receipt rarely occurs. For example, of the March 1992
cohort of benefit recipients, 4 percent of spells ended that way. The risk of disqualifica-
tion was much higher for the young, the less-educated, blue-collar workers, and those
living in the capital, Budapest. While conceivably such differences could occur with the
same degree of enforcement of the rules, in all likelihood the severity with which the
sanctions are imposed vary across offices within the country – as well as between coun-
tries. For example, the risk of benefit disqualification in Slovenia is much lower than in
Hungary – in 1998, only one percent of spells ended with disqualification, and in 1999,
only 0.65 percent, despite changes in legislation aimed at improving the monitoring of
benefit eligibility. And in Estonia, a country with extremely modest unemployment
benefits, casual evidence suggest that employment offices sometimes side with the un-
employed and do not take any actions that would result in disqualification – precisely
because the benefit is so low (see OECD 2000 for evidence on OECD countries).
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programs, we are thus suggesting to rely primarily on financial incentives and work
requirements coupled with benefit sanctions, as opposed to monitoring (for the evalu-
ation of these methods, see Fredriksson and Holmlund 2006a and Fredriksson and
Holmlund 2006b).
16The total number of recipients has been relatively small – on average, about 100–
125,000 workers receive benefits, out of 2 million officially unemployed workers. Ad-
ministration of the program (processing of claims and payment of benefits) was handed
over to the social security system (ANSES – Administración Nacional de la Seguridad
Nacional), which operates a national network of offices and which reports to the Minis-
try of Labor and Social Security. Workers go to one of 150 local ANSES offices to
register and receive their checks; there are no job placement or other reemployment
services provided (Mazza 2000).
17Establishing mutual responsibilities is an increasingly popular approach to minimize
the disincentives to work in developed and European transition countries (see Almeida
et al. 2012). The approach consists of “soft” obligations to search for a job and attend
training, or of “hard” requirements to participate in public works or community work.
18Introduction of UI thus underscores the need for the strategy of the development
of overall employment services (discussing the role, nature and scope of such services
is beyond the scope of this paper).
19Both OECD (2011) and Commander (2010) single out UISAs, accompanied by
some form of redistribution, as a useful mechanism for providing unemployment
benefits in developing countries.
20The potential of UISAs for improving work incentives can be gauged by the reduc-
tion of redistribution of income implied by the shift from the standard UI program.
Namely, the UISAs are based on lifetime income, as opposed to much more volatile
current income, thereby enabling workers to self-finance shorter unemployment spells
and making more room for public funds to be targeted to those facing larger shocks.
The system thus eliminates the “piggy-bank” function of UI – the redistribution of in-
come across the life cycle implied by paying contributions to the central fund at one
time and receiving benefits from this fund at another time. Such redistribution
represents the majority of spending in welfare states (Barr 2001 reports that two-thirds
to three-quarters of welfare-state spending is life-cycle redistribution).
21In contrast to the Chilean program, under the Mauritian UISAs the financing of
benefits is split equally between the worker’ UISA and the Workfare Program Fund,
and it continues from the solidarity fund only after the individual account is exhausted
(Republic of Mauritius 2008).
22(Berstein et al. 2008) find that most workers value the program, particularly older
and more educated as they are more likely to benefit from the solidarity funding.
23For example, Feldstein and Altman (1998) simulated the working of UISAs for the U.
S. and concluded, based on the ability of individuals to pool resources across time, that
such a program is a viable alternative to the standard UI program (a similar conclusion is
reached by Folster 1999 and Folster 2001, for Sweden, and Vodopivec 2010 for Slovenia).
24In the period of investigation, only workers who prior to unemployment worked
under permanent contracts and were laid off for reasons attributable to the employer
could access solidarity funding.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/125Assessing the desirability and prospects of the introduction of UI program to
developing countries, Yoo (2001), for example, argued against its immediate introduction
to a country like the Philippines, but maintained that the program should be seriously
considered in the medium term, once the most suitable program design is determined
and adequate capacity built (including for record-keeping and fee-collection).
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